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INTRODUCTION 
In July 2006, District Court Judge Goldring delivered a judgment that caused the insurance industry 
concern.  In Garcia v CGU Workers Compensation Pty Ltd (unreported, NSW D Ct, 14 July 2006) it was 
held that the insurers had breached a tortious duty of good faith it owed to the respondent by stopping the 
respondent’s weekly workers’ compensation payments.  It was held that this duty of good faith, a novel 
tort, existed independently of the  legislative workers’ compensation scheme. 
 As expected, the decision was appealed and in CGU Workers Compensation Pty Ltd v Garcia [2007] 
NSWCA 193 (10 August 2007) the New South Wales Court of Appeal rejected the argument that the 
insurer owed a duty of good faith to the respondent as a worker entitled to compensation under the statutory 
scheme. 
 RECOGNITION OF THE TORTIOUS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH BY THE DISTRICT COURT 
On 2 August 1999 the respondent was injured at work and the employer’s insurer (HIH at the time) was 
notified of the compensation claim on 11 August 1999.  The respondent returned to work on 12 August 
1999 but his employment was terminated two months later.  Two medical reports were obtained and 
forwarded to HIH, both favourable to the respondent receiving compensation.  The respondent was also 
assessed by an orthopaedic surgeon at the arrangement of HIH which was also favourable to the claim.  The 
respondent was informed that his claim for compensation had been accepted by HIH and the weekly 
payments commenced.  However, HIH was investigating the respondent’s claim as there were doubts as to 
the genuineness of the claim and the degree to which the employment had contributed to it.  In January 
2000, HIH discontinued the weekly compensation payments after an assessor’s report alleged that the 
respondent’s injury arose from the cumulative effect of working as a fitter over many years and did not 
relate to the incident reported as taking place on 2 August 1999.  Additionally, another medical report 
obtained by HIH stated that the injury was not work related and was the result of a degenerative process in 
the respondent’s disc. 
 The respondent challenged the decision of the insurer and in April 2001 the claim for compensation was 
re-accepted by the appellant which had taken over from HIH as HIH had been placed in provisional 
liquidation.    However, by the time the weekly compensation recommenced the respondent had spent all of 
his savings and owed money to family and friends.  The claim by the respondent alleged that appellant 
owed a tortious duty to act in good faith towards the respondent in relation to any claims made under the 
workers’ compensation scheme by the respondent. 
 District Court Judge Goldring held that there was a tortious duty of good faith and relied upon the 
reasoning of Badgery-Parker J in Gibson v Parkes District Hospital (1991) 26 NSWLR 9.  In that case the 
plaintiff had alleged that her employer and its insurer owed her a duty to deal with her in good faith when 
processing and paying her workers’ compensation and that this had been breached by delaying or denying 
the amount of compensation she was entitled .  The decision was in relation to an interlocutory proceeding 
in which the plaintiff was seeking to join the insurer to the proceedings.  Therefore although the court 
referred to American case law and agreed that the ‘special relationship’ between an insurer and an injured 
worker warranted a duty of good faith, the issue was not decided as the matter was settled by consent.  
 It was held that the duty of good faith had been breached as HIH had pre-judged the merits of the 
respondent’s claim and did not act upon evidence that was contrary to the view that the injury was not work 
related.  Damages were assessed as $451,317.50, which included $50,000 in exemplary damages.  
Exemplary damages were said to be suitable as the appellant had acted recklessly without regard to the 
respondent’s rights as HIH’s conduct was high-handed and deliberate. 
 COURT OF APPEAL DENIES TORTIOUS DUTY OF GOOD FAITH 
On appeal the appellant argued that the statutory compensation scheme did not require the novel tort that 
had been recognised by the trial judge.  The court agreed, Mason P stating that such a duty would create ‘a 
cause of action that cut across the legislative and contractual framework’ (at [57]).  His Honour examined 
many cases decided after Gibson v Parkes District Hospital, stating that ‘caselaw subsequent to Gibson has 
been hostile to the reception of the tort’ (at [110]; see Gimson v Victorian WorkCover Authority [1995] 1 
VR 209; Employer’s Mutual Indemnity (Workers Compensation) Ltd v A Donald Pty Ltd (unreported, 
NSWCA, 23 October 1997); Ilievska-Dieva v SGIO Insurance Ltd [2000] WASCA 161 (9 June 2000); 
Lomsargis v National Mutual Life Association of Australasia Ltd [2005] 2 Qd R 295).  His Honour pointed 
out that the High Court had recently in Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd [2007] HCA 22 at 
[134] issued a stern warning that intermediate courts of appeal should not  go beyond long-established 
authority (at [61]).   
 The reasons as to why there should be no recognition of a tortious duty of good faith were many.  For 
example, the issue of coherency, which Mason P stated arose as several stages.  At [64] his Honour stated 
that the novel tort could not ‘contradict the terms or policies of the statutory and contractual framework’ in 
which it would be placed. This point was discussed by Santow JA, his Honour making observations about 
the approach that should be taken in respect to the existence or scope of a novel tort.  At [175] his Honour 
states that the control exercised by the appellant, the degree of vulnerability of those who depended upon 
the appellant to properly exercise its powers and the consistency of the duty with the scope and purpose of 
the statutory compensation scheme were relevant considerations.  Although the purpose of the scheme is to 
benefit the employees and it could not be said that the tort of good faith went against that (at [180]), there is 
conflict between such a tort and the detailed provisions of the compensation scheme (at [181]).  The 
incoherence arising mainly from the award of damages. 
 For example, in relation to the award of exemplary damages, Australian law has not accepted exemplary 
damages being awarded for breach of contract and this novel tort would allow exemplary damages in the 
‘back door’ as it involves a statutory contract (at [73]).  Further, a duty of good faith that allows 
compensation for losses arsing from an unjustified delay in meeting an insurance claim causes conflict with 
a plaintiff’s entitlement to an award of interest (at [75]).   
 The outcome of recognising a tortious duty of good faith would be compensation for distress or 
disappointment arising from non-performance of a contract.  This would allow tortious claims for 
psychiatric injury that was not a consequence of any physical injury that justified the payment of workers’ 
compensation (at [77]). 
   
 CONCLUSION 
Recognition of a tortious duty of good faith would have very serious ramifications for insurers.  As Mason 
P discussed at [80], recognition of the novel tort would add significant risks to the enterprise of workplace 
insurance as claims could be made with a range of motives, not necessarily all genuine, exposing the 
insurer to unpredictable liability.  At [81] Mason P reasons that such claims would necessarily lead to 
higher premiums and may also impact on the ability of the insurers to meet claims for actual work place 
injury.  In light of the ‘insurance crisis’ that led to the national review of the law of negligence, any court 
should be very wary of a decision that had the potential to impact upon insurance premiums that affect such 
a large sector of the community and affect the economy. 
 
